Defusing Pakistan’s Tribal Rebellion
November 2007 

by Shaukat Qadir 

Since September 2007 the Pakistan army’s troop build-up in the country’s tribal belt has reached unprecedented levels. In the last month, the military has deployed an additional 2,500 security personnel armed with heavy artillery, armed helicopters and air support to re-establish state control in the face of increasing defiance. 

In Swat, an area not bordering Afghanistan, Maulana Fazlullah, a rebel cleric, is intent on imposing his own interpretation of Shariah, Islamic law, in defiance of state laws. In Waziristan and Bajaur, both bordering Afghanistan, the local tribes have revolted against the state. They have captured more than 400 security personnel, and while some 50-odd have been returned to their organizations, every few days the bodies of others are found murdered. Why have the Pashtun tribes suddenly decided to challenge the state? And can they be suppressed by force? 

It is impossible to understand the current situation without tracing the historical events that have changed the entire fabric of the traditional tribal structure and led to the current violence. This is an insurgency instead of a war by (or against) terrorists. Failure to understand this will lead to a disastrous decision to continue to use force to suppress a movement that cannot be put down by power alone. 

Changing Pashtuns 

Within the Pashtun belt of Northwest Frontier Province the tribes have always been fiercely independent and refused to accept foreign domination. Consequently, the British colonial authorities lived in a state of uneasy peace with them and made no attempt to bring them within the fold of British India. In 1947, at the partition of India, these tribes readily became part of Pakistan. However, apprehensive of the consequences of bringing them completely within the fold of the Constitution, the new nation accorded them special status, which they continue to enjoy. 

This means that these tribes are exempt from all forms of taxes. Tribal customs and traditions remained inviolate; in other words, while they have representation in both houses of parliament, they are self-governing entities within the state of Pakistan. Even the national security forces are welcome to operate in their areas only for specific purposes. No Pakistani government has made any endeavor to change their status, even when the tribes were ripe for it. 

Traditionally, the Pashtun tribes, whether Afghan or Pakistani, are very egalitarian, more so than any other region of Pakistan, in the sense that every member of the tribe enjoys equal rights as far as the application of tribal law is concerned. However, they also have a very strict class system, which is based not on wealth but as a demonstration of respect to members of certain families whose forefathers may have done the tribe a noteworthy service. Only scions of certain traditionally respected families, the “blue blooded,” may become members of the tribal council of elders or jirga. The council decides on who is to be included as a member and who will lead it. Each tribe or subtribe will normally have its own jirga that meets and confers on an ad hoc basis. 

The council functions as the legislature, judiciary, and the executive; ensuring equality and justice to all members of the tribe; crimes committed outside the tribal area may be ignored or dealt with lightly, but those committed against fellow tribesmen are dealt with promptly and harshly. An individual cast out of the tribe is ostracized even by his own family. Disputes between tribes or those involving members of two tribes are usually settled by a combined jirga of the tribes involved. 

While on the complaint of a commoner who feels that one of the elders has denied his rights, the council can oust that elder from the council, it was inconceivable in the traditional tribal system for a commoner to be able to lead a revolt against the system. Moreover, the mullah or cleric used to be very far down the scale of the tribal class system. A Pashto saying, in which an elder is addressing a mullah roughly translates to, “I will not let people consider you below a menial, but don’t dare look upwards.” All this has since changed: Today commoners are not only challenging the system, they are killing tribal elders who they perceive as being in opposition to them. They have executed more than 40 elders in the last year or so for supporting President Pervez Musharraf, or being pro-United States, which is considered to be the same thing. These days the mullahs—supported by armed militant revolutionaries—dictate terms to tribal elders. 

The traditional tribal structure in both Afghanistan and Pakistan has been torn asunder, for only slightly different reasons. The Pakistani Pashtuns—even those from the more settled areas like the Uthmanzais, the Yousafzais, the Alizais, the inland Khattaks, and even the Niazis—have always been proud of their Afghan heritage. Consequently, while all Pashtuns are directly concerned with the happenings in Afghanistan, the tribes bordering them will continue to fight alongside their tribal brethren on the other side of the Durand Line that divides Afghanistan and Pakistan. They have always done so—against British and Russian invasions in the distant past, the Soviet invasion two decades ago, and now against the American forces in occupation of Afghanistan. 

The beginning of the end of the traditional tribal system can be traced back to the war against Soviet occupation in the 1980s. Non-Pashtun tribes in those areas of Afghanistan bordering what was then the U.S.S.R. took to the campaign immediately and were led by their tribal leaders. On the other hand, the Pashtuns, being farther inland, had more time to react. Thus, while some tribal elders led their own campaign against the Russians, most appointed warlords; Hamid Karzai, currently president of Afghanistan, was appointed by his father; Abdul Qadir and Abdul Haq were appointed by their uncle, and so on. 

In the wake of the Soviet withdrawal, while some of these warlords appointed for the campaign chose to return to traditional customs, others decided that they enjoyed enough support among their followers to take over the tribal leadership and proceeded to do so. This added to the anarchy that reigned from 1989-94, when the Taliban entered the fray. 

Realizing that the tide of the Taliban had become inexorable, most of the tribal elders and the rest of the blue blooded Afghan Pashtuns chose to leave their country. The primary reason for doing so was the unacceptability of Mullah Muhammed Omar as their leader, a non-blue blooded Pashtun. The fact that he was also a mullah only added to the insult. This led to disastrous consequences when the traditional leadership returned in the wake of the invasion of Afghanistan by the U.S. Although they were able to lead minirevolts in their provinces to help accelerate the fall of the Taliban, the members of the tribe felt betrayed by the fact that their leaders had abandoned them to the tyranny of the Taliban. This loss of respect for the tribal elders is the root cause of the current anarchy in Afghanistan. 

In Pakistan, on the other hand, those Pashtun who had chosen to fight alongside their Afghan brethren had no appointed leadership and, since very few of the “blue bloods” joined them, the leadership that emerged in the course of combat came mainly from the commoners. They returned to their traditional life until they realized that the Americans were treating their Afghan brethren little better than the Soviets had. Thus began what would more appropriately be referred to as an “Afghan Nationalist Freedom Movement.” The media began to call them Taliban and al Qaeda—which they were not— but they accepted the titles with pride because those labels denoted resistance to the all-powerful U.S. Today, many of them are becoming Taliban and are developing al Qaeda connections, although that is not how they started. 

Enter the Taliban  

The birth of the Taliban, which is often erroneously, and sometimes maliciously attributed to the Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence or the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, was actually an impromptu movement instigated by the public rape of a young girl in Mullah Muhammed Omar’s village in the vicinity of Kandahar in August 1994. About 150 Taliban, some, like Mulla Muhammed Omar veterans of the Afghan-Soviet war and some raw youngsters, began to impose Shariah law, and bring peace to the region. The truth is that when the ISI initially heard of this movement they considered it a bit of a joke. But then stalwarts of other local warlords began to throng to them; not only did their ranks swell, but they conquered territory without fighting a single pitched battle—until, of course, the ISI led them into the disastrous invasion of Mazar-e-Sharif, some 400 kilometers north of Kabul, bordering the Tajik-dominated area.  

Until Mazar-e-Sharif, the Taliban had followed the classic concept of guerrilla war found in Mao Zedong’s writings, avoiding pitched battles and encircling strongholds to capture ill-defended surroundings, thus forcing the enemy to surrender. Mazar-e-Sharif was developed as a stronghold by the Northern alliance under the able leadership of Ahmed Shah Masood and it was here that, due to the insistence of the isi, the Taliban were fated to suffer numerous reversals and pay a heavy price, in terms of loss of life and equipment, attempting to capture and recapture the fortified area. 

However, when Kandahar fell to the Taliban in September 1994—the isi, and subsequently the cia—began to take them seriously. The Taliban began to receive arms, ammunition, helicopters and even aircraft. A usually forgotten part of the story is that initially they burned all the poppy fields that came under their control; moreover, to start with, they provided peaceful and representative rule, through tribal and even village councils, thus fulfilling their promises of bringing peace. Not only did women go back to work, they could freely roam the market places unescorted. 

However, this idyllic existence was destined to be short lived. Soon abandoned by the U.S., the Taliban were strapped for cash and ordered that poppy growth be restarted. In 1996 when Osama bin Laden was declared persona non grata in Sudan and arrived in Afghanistan to find a safe haven, the Taliban were still unable to make ends meet, even though they had become the largest exporters of opiates in the world. Whether bin Laden used monetary assistance to coopt the Taliban or Mullah Omar merely succumbed to his influence, bin Laden’s arrival heralded the beginning of a major shift in the movement. 

Bin Laden wanted a more stringent version of Islam and once again women were prevented from working and could no longer move around unescorted. The religious police gained increasing authority to act indiscriminately; if a man’s beard did not measure to the right size he could be turned over and whacked on his buttocks in the streets. The same treatment could be meted out to any woman deemed to be improperly dressed. Soon they were empowered to execute any individual suspected of anti-state or un-Islamic behavior. The proud Afghan was proud no more.  

Thus, these very same tribal leaders who are today fighting against the Americans, welcomed the U.S. intervention in Afghanistan. The rapid overthrow of the Taliban was due not only to the assistance provided by the National Alliance, but also to minirevolts in most provinces, led by the traditional tribal leaders. 

Post 9/11 Scenario 

When it became clear that the U.S. was in Afghanistan to stay and that even though a Pashtun ex-warlord and veteran of the anti-Soviet war, Hamid Karzai, was chosen to lead the country, the fact that he permitted the U.S. to dictate to him and include a disproportionately high representation of the non-Pashtun members from the National Alliance made him suspect. In the opinion of some analysts, had Abdul Qadir not been murdered, it is possible that Qadir might have been able to put together a dispensation that could have ruled Afghanistan in relative peace. But then he would not have readily acquiesced to the U.S. and, therefore, might not have been acceptable to them. 

So far, U.S. forces continue their use of indiscriminate force, causing complaints even from their European allies. British forces resent U.S. intrusions into territories supposedly under their control, with disastrous effects. Consequently, amongst the Afghan Pashtuns, and now even amongst the Afghan non-Pashtuns, as well as the Pashtuns in Pakistan’s tribal belts, there is a deep rooted hatred for the U.S. and its allies, including the Pakistani government. Members of inland Pashtun tribes of the Northwest Frontier Province have sworn to take Mr. Musharraf’s life even if he flees the country.  

Islamabad’s efforts to get support from the traditional tribal leadership of the Wazirs, the Mahsuds, and the Mohmands—the three principal Pashtun tribes living astride the Durand Line—in attempting to prevent their tribesmen from supporting the Afghans against American occupation, backfired and resulted in a revolt in these tribes against the traditional leadership, led by survivors of the struggle against the Soviets. For instance, a common Waziri veteran of the Afghan-Soviet conflict, Nek Muhammed, shot to fame a couple of years ago when he successfully challenged the tribal leadership during a jirga organized by the government to negotiate with the Waziri tribe. His argument was that “if it was jihad, sanctioned by the Pakistani and Saudi government and supported by the U.S., for me to kill the Soviets when they kicked us in the ass, why should we be expected to kiss the boot of the American, when he does the same.” The Pakistan army had him killed, but members of all the neighboring tribes thronged to his burial, and no tribal elder dared absent himself from the funeral. Nek Muhammed became a martyr to the proud tribals, who braved death in their fight against tyranny. 

Pakistan’s security forces, in addition to the use of field artillery, have now also resorted to aerial bombing and strafing, in addition to the use of attack helicopters. To understand the effect of this bombardment, consider that if a 500-pound bomb falls within half a kilometer of habitation, all children begin to bleed from their ears and noses, and some are maimed for life. Such injuries go unrecorded, but obviously they multiply the alienation felt among these tribes. 

Under these circumstances, there appears little hope, since it all becomes a vicious circle. Some of the tribals who wish to return to the traditional system and find a way of making peace with their government hold the view that U.S. attacks against them are intended to subvert their reaching an agreement with the Pakistani government. However, any attempt at negotiating with the Pakistan government is soon followed by another attack from the U.S. forces in Afghanistan. They must retaliate, thus forcing the Pakistani forces to again take military action against them or to permit the Americans to do so. Thus the cycle of violence continues. 

Another attempt is underway as of Oct. 25 to negotiate with the Waziris, but given the circumstances there is little chance of success. The Pak-Afghan jirga or any other jirga can succeed only if undertakings by all sides can be fulfilled. Unfortunately, Mr. Karzai is in no position to fulfill anything, being wholly at the mercy of the Americans. His power is limited to Kabul alone and is often questioned even there; he is dependent on American forces for his personal safety and can hardly be expected to enforce upon the occupying American forces any agreement that he endorses at a jirga. Likewise, the Pakistan government, even if it could fulfill its obligations, would find itself sabotaged by American forces in Afghanistan. 

It is unlikely that Pakistan can form a government capable of addressing this issue successfully. During his address to the United Nations General Assembly a couple of years ago, General Musharraf boldly stated that “as long as there is injustice in Palestine, Lebanon and other parts of the so-called ‘Muslim World,’ terrorism will not end. The war on terror cannot be won by force alone. I suggest that it can, in fact, never be won by force; but only by justice, equality and freedom.” However, as the Americans would say, “he could not walk the talk.”  

The tribes are fighting against the American occupation of Afghanistan; to them America is the universal tyrant and anything American is anti-Islam. For instance, an attempt at polio eradication in the tribal belt was sabotaged by the mullahs who dubbed it “an American attempt to subvert our future generations.” Many of the youngsters who had volunteered for this humanitarian effort were attacked and two were killed, forcing the government to call off the immunization drive.  

Americans Out 

Mr. Bush is unlikely to have a sudden change of heart and decide to pull U.S. troops out of Afghanistan and Iraq. Similarly, the chances are slim that he can assure the Muslim majority countries that in future the U.S. support to Israel will be conditional on the Israelis maintaining peace and that he will ensure that a viable Palestinian state will be created. It is, therefore, impossible to eradicate the hate for what America and Americans stand for today in the eyes of these tribes and, by extension, what the Musharraf-led Pakistan government stands for. However, there still exists an alternative that is viable and could bring peace to this troubled region, permitting the government to bring about the long overdue socioeconomic developments that could result in a lasting peace. 

Ideally, Mr. Musharraf, irrevocably linked to the U.S., must go. However, if he takes off his uniform and someone else is calling the shots it might again be possible to negotiate with the tribes. Any meaningful jirga will now have to include the warlords who enjoy popular support and are not under the control of the traditional leadership, even though some may have Taliban and/or al Qaeda connections. 

To initiate a dialogue with the tribes, the state must re-establish its writ over its citizens, which it has lost because it is viewed as being run on orders from Washington. To do so, instead of stating as Benazir Bhutto did in Washington that she would “permit U.S. forces to strike terrorist camps in Pakistan,” it will have to do just the opposite: serve public notice to U.S. forces operating from Afghanistan that, while Pakistani forces will continue their fight against their own terrorists or any foreigners that have sought refuge in its territory and will welcome any assistance by way of intelligence, any strike by the U.S. in Pakistani territory will be considered an act of war, and Pakistani security forces will fight alongside their tribal brethren to repulse such an attack. 

The only qualities the Pashtun tribes respect are strength and courage. Threats or the use of force without offering them protection will only strengthen their resolve and, while continuing to weaken the traditional system, will strengthen the following of the mullahs. Once they realize that the state is willing to protect them against aggression by the all-powerful Americans, they will be prepared to accept the state’s right to punish them for violating laws. If as a consequence U.S. forces ceased to violate their territory, the tribes receiving state support against the Americans would be firmly back in the fold. Only then can the state reason with them to explain that to get the Americans out of Afghanistan might not be possible, but a reduction of their numbers and reduction of the current repression could be brought about if relative peace existed in Afghanistan. As a consequence of this, a joint Pak-Afghan jirga would be more meaningful. 

There is, however, little likelihood that any leader in Pakistan will have the courage to make such a commitment, let alone be prepared to act on it. And in such an eventuality, the traditional leadership of these border tribes will likely either succumb to popular demands and become party to the conflict with the rest of the country and empower the mullahs; or it will be ousted from authority and fresh leadership will emerge under the mullahs. In either case, Pakistan is likely to witness increasing domestic violence and instability. 

Mr. Qadir is a retired brigadier general of the Pakistani army, based in Rawalpindi, Pakistan.